New EEC Safeguard Measures: Regulation 288/82 by Lussenburg, Selma M.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 16 | Issue 3
1984
New EEC Safeguard Measures: Regulation 288/82
Selma M. Lussenburg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Selma M. Lussenburg, New EEC Safeguard Measures: Regulation 288/82, 16 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 337 (1984)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol16/iss3/2
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by Selma M. Lussenburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
he current global economic recession and relative economic success
of the newly industrialized countries and Japan has greatly affected
the trade policy of most western nations. Due to the economic downturn
and concomitant internal political, social and economic pressures, trade
liberalization initiatives have largely come to a standstill. Increasingly,
statesmen are seeking to respond to domestic pressures through the im-
position of protectionist trade measures. The number of orderly market-
ing arrangements (OMA's), voluntary export restraints (VER's) and other
measures which restrict imports, has increased exponentially over the
past decade.1 Proponents of such restrictions have justified their use by
pointing to the inability of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)2 to effectively counter the influx into their economies of highly
competitive goods from new sources.'
One of the GATT provisions which has been subject to particularly
* LL.B. (1980), B.S. (1977), University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. The author wishes
to gratefully acknowledge the assistance and encouragement received from Mrs. Robyn Bur-
nett, senior lecturer of the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
ISee UNrrE NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEvELOPmENT (UNCTAD), GROWING
PROTECTIONISM AND THE STANDSTILL ON TRADE BARRIERS AGAINST IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPING
CouNTRiEs, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/194 (Mar. 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD, GROW-
ING PROTECTIONISM]; see also Hindley, Voluntary Export Restraints and the GATT's Main
Escape Clause, 3 WORLD ECONOMY 313, 316 (1980) (suggesting that the GATT estimate that
three to five percent of world trade is affected by VER's or OMA's substantially understates
the incidence of such protective measures).
Although the terms VER and OMA are at times used interchangeably, a distinction is
usually drawn between the two on the basis of negotiating parties. VER's are usually the
result of negotiations between the industries within the exporting and importing countries,
or between the exporting industry and the importing government. OMA's are normally gov-
ernment to government agreements. See UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM, supra, at 6;
Orderly Marketing Arrangements, 1978 Am. Soc'y INV'L L. 1 (proceedings of the 72d annual
meeting) (remarks of the chairman, J. Jackson).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
3 D. ROBERTSON, FAIL SAFE SYSTEMS FOR TRADE LIBERALISATION 7-9 (1977); Hindley,
supra note 1, at 328-37.
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heavy criticism 4 is the principal safeguard clause, article XIX.5 In the
event of a sudden increase in imports causing serious injury, article XIX
authorizes emergency action through the withdrawal of tariff concessions
or the imposition of quantitative restrictions on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis.' Contracting Parties adversely affected by such measures are permit-
ted to take retaliatory action.7 The fear of retaliation has meant that arti-
cle XIX has lost its appeal for many countries. Thus, major trading
nations which are able to economically threaten their trading partners
with unilateral action have instead proceeded to persuade their counter-
parts to enter into "voluntary" restrictive measures.$
Over the past several years, reform of article XIX and other safe-
guard measures has consistently been on the GATT agenda; however, to
date, neither amendments nor even a separate Safeguards Code has met
with the approval of the Contracting Parties.9 The inability of the partici-
pants at the Tokyo Round 0 to agree to a Safeguards Code has led to
further independent protectionist action and circumvention of the
GATT.
12
4 See generally D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 19-22; Hindley, supra note 1, at 313-41;
MacBean, How to Repair the "Safety Net" of the International Trading System, 1 WORLD
ECONOMY 149-61 (1977-78); Tumlir, A Revised Safeguard Clause for GATT?., 7 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 404 (1973).
5 GATT, supra note 2, at A58, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 54, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258. Article XII,
which permits quantitative import restrictions for balance of payment purposes, is the main
safeguard provision of the GATT. Other safeguard provisions include articles VI, XVIII,
XX and XXVIII and Part IV of the GATT.
6 Id. at A58-59, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 54-55, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258-60.
7 Id. at A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 56, 55 U.N.T.S. at 260.
8 Sauermilch, Market Safeguards Against Import Competition: Article XIX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 112, 113 (1982).
For example, Australia has entered into a VER with the United States regarding beef ex-
ports. DEP'T OF TRADE, MEDIA RELEASE (Aug. 11, 1983) (statement by Hon. L.F. Bowen,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade); Id. (July 27, 1983); DEP'T OF TRADE AND
RESOURCES, MEDIA RELEASE (Aug. 30, 1982) (statement by Rt. Hon. J.D. Anthony, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources). Australia has entered into a similar
VER with the EEC on sheep and goat meat. Statement by Rt. Hon. J.D. Anthony, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources (Sept. 21, 1980) (press release).
9 See GATT: Ministerial Declaration, reprinted in 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67, 70 (1983)
which asserts once again the need for "an improved and more efficient safeguard system."
10 This term has been applied to the Sept. 1973 meeting of ministers in Tokyo which
began the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. See Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 84 n.2.
11 Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GATT, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 41, 61-62 (1981). The
Contracting Parties have, however, held biannual meetings to monitor GATT safeguard
measures as well as other measures which serve similar purposes. The Nordic countries have
suggested that a working party be established to consider inter alia the best use of such
safeguard notifications. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAlRFS AND TRADE,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD] 210 (26th
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On February 5, 1982, the Council of the European Communities en-
acted Regulation 288/82 on common rules for imports. 2 This regulation is
the principal European Economic Community (EEC) instrument dealing
with safeguards, and in some respects appears to be very similar to the
GATT article XIX. The regulation represents an innovative and highly
protective safeguard mechanism which may, however, undermine the
GATT through the introduction of investigation procedures, the use of
deterrent as well as actual safeguards, and selective application of safe-
guards. At the same time, the regulation suffers from many of the weak-
nesses which are found in article XIX.' 3
The author will examine the new EEC protective measure, its appli-
cation to date, the relation to GATT, and the broader implications which
the measure raises for the GATT and international trade. However, to
analyze this regulation without a comparative standard or reference point
is of limited value. Thus, the regulation will be examined in light of the
purported shortcomings of article XIX of the GATT.
II. ARTICLE XIX OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
A. General
Article XIX is one of the most controversial escape clauses in the
GATT. Unlike other GATT provisions such as article XII (quantitative
restrictions), the criteria which permit article XIX emergency action are
less defined and considerably more subjective.
The inclusion of article XIX in the GATT reflects political reality;
that is, the need to make any international trade agreement acceptable to
all of the Contracting Parties and their constituencies. Parties must be
able to free themselves from negotiated tariff bindings which, due to a
change in circumstances, threaten to disrupt domestic production of a
particular product. Article XIX safeguard action has been compared to
the international law principle of rebus sic stantibus14 because the article
is only supposed to be applied when circumstances arise that are funda-
mentally different from those in existence at the time the tariff binding
was concluded. Safeguard action should apply to unforeseen develop-
ments not taken into account in the initial negotiations. The justification
Supp. 1978-79); Notification and Surveillances, Mar. 26, 1980, GATT, BISD 20 (27th Supp.
1979-80). At present, the major Contracting Parties are unwilling to do anything more than
provide information. At a minimum, this will provide data upon which criticisms of safe-
guard actions may be founded.
12 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 288/82 on common rules for imports, Feb. 5, 1982, 25
O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 35) 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 288/82].
" See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
24 K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECOMONIC ORGANIZATION 99
(1970); D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 5-7; Merciai, supra note 11, at 4.
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for the inclusion of safeguard measures has been that such safeguards en-
sure an increased participation in the GATT and permit the development
of global or regional trade regimes.15
Examination of article XIX is facilitated by first analyzing the condi-
tions for application and then reviewing the substantive measures which
may be invoked once these conditions have been established.
B. Prerequisites to the Application of Article XIX
Article XIX cannot be resorted to indiscriminately. Emergency pro-
tective action is only authorized when the following prerequisites are
established:"'
(i) that there is actual or threatened serious injury to a domestic
industry;
(ii) that such injury "stems from a tariff reduction, and precisely
from the tariff reduction that the importing country seeks to
withdraw";17
(iii) that it is a result of developments not foreseen at the time the
concession was made;18
16 K. DAM, supra note 14, at 99, 107.
16 The full text of GATT Article XIX(1) is as follows:
(a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obliga-
tions incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff con-
cessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competi-
tive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and
to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the
concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of the concession with respect to a
preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the cir-
cumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive prod-
ucts in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such prefer-
ence, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party
so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw
or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
GATT, supra note 2, at A58-59, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 54-55, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258-60.
17 Merciai, supra note 11, at 44.
16 The Hatters' Fur Case clarifies this point. In that case, it was noted that while the
United States could have anticipated a change in women's hat fashions, it could not be
expected to know which way the fashions would change. Such unforeseen developments,
while hypothetically possible, were not specifically foreseeable. Report on the Withdrawal
by the United States of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the GATT, Sales No.
GATT/1951-3 (Nov. 1951), cited in part in J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
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(iv) that the injury is caused by an increase in imports relative to
domestic production of the same product. 1'
Each of these four conditions and their interpretation will be considered
briefly.
Article XIX is to apply only in instances of serious injury. Serious
injury, however, is not defined. This lack of definition leaves a great deal
of discretion to the party invoking or desiring to invoke the article. This
may lead to its unwarranted application. It is sufficient that the injury be
threatened; it need not actually exist.
It has been suggested that to "cause or threaten to cause serious in-
jury," the injury sustained or sustainable must be more severe than the
level of injury found in article VI (anti-dumping and countervailing du-
ties).20 This provides a comparative standard for assessment, but does not
resolve the issue. Article XIX applications have usually been dealt with
on a case by case basis. The lack of criteria specifying what constitutes
serious injury has been a source of controversy.2 1 The problem of defining
injury or market disruption has been debated within the GATT since
1959.22 Importing states hold that the application of a high standard, or a
restrictive interpretation of the article XIX "serious injury" standard,
will serve to encourage Contracting Parties to introduce measures that
fall outside the scope of the GATT. Thus, a liberal interpretation of the
article XIX provision (i.e., a lower standard) is meant to ensure that par-
ties will abide by GATT provisions, and that they will not resort to mea-
sures outside the GATT which would otherwise undermine it. Despite
such a liberal interpretation, Contracting Parties have felt a need to re-
sort to measures outside the GATT. The proliferation of OMA's, VER's, 23
and the enactment of regulations such as the EEC's Regulation 288/82,24
demonstrate that the logic of this rationale is questionable.
Article XIX provides that an increase in imports must be the result
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 618-20 (1977).
, J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 556-59 (1969); see Report of the
Working Party on Modifications to the General Agreement, GATT, BISD 39, 44 (2d Supp.
1954).
20 E. MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNIrE STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY 230 (1982) (citing Lowenfield, Fair or Unfair Trade:
Does it Matter, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 205 (1980)).
21 J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 561-63.
2 See Avoidance of Market Disruption, GATT, BISD 22 (8th Supp. 1960).
10 See Bronckers, Een judische analyse van beschermende maatregelen tegen Japanse
importen in de Europese Gemeenschap, 30 SoCIAAL EcoNOMscHE WETGEVING (No. 10) 670
(1982) (discussion of EEC measures taken against Japanese imports both before and after
the enactment of Regulation 288/82); Green, The New Protectionism, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1, 5-11 (1981).
14 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12.
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of both GATT obligations and unforeseen developments. Although there
has been substantial discussion over what constitutes a GATT obliga-
tion,25 the language has generally been resolved to mean both tariff con-
cessions granted, and the withdrawal, elimination or reduction of quanti-
tative restrictions." This precondition clearly establishes that a tariff
concession can only be withdrawn, or have its value impaired by the im-
position of a quota, when the tariff concession is the source of injury.
There must be a direct causal link between the concession granted, the
goods imported in increased quantities, and the injury sustained; it can-
not be an indirect injury which results from a concession on other
products.
A larger problem has been and continues to be determining what
constitutes an unforeseen development. The Hatters' Fur Case27 sets a
precedent providing for a broad interpretation of the phrase. The GATT
Working Party decided that it was the degree of "unforeseeability" that
was relevant: "[s]uch developments might appear as hypothetical at the
time of agreement, but could not be foreseeable in concreto.''28
The prerequisite that imports have increased is the least subjective
criterion found in the article. Import statistics are normally readily avail-
able, and thus such developments can be more objectively assessed than
the other article XIX conditions. It is sufficient that there be a relative
increase in imports; an absolute increase is not necessary.29 A price differ-
ence between domestic and imported goods is also not required.30
The fourth condition is that the invocation of article XIX is not
available as a safeguard measure to protect a recently established pro-
ducer or a totally new industry. This falls under the article XXVIII pro-
visions.31 The injured domestic product must already be on the market.
Article XIX measures are thus not available to deal with the problems
facing producers deprived of future access to markets.3 2
" J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 557-59.
26 Id. This does not cover every conceivable situation. For example, to establish a tariff
quota is not to withdraw a concession in terms of a rate of duty because the quota only
affects quantity. The Contracting Parties may take measures which do not constitute GATT
obligations, and thus Article XIX may have no application. See also infra note 42 and ac-
companying text.
2? See supra note 18.
28 Merciai, supra note 11, at 44 n.13.
J8 . JACKSON, supra note 19, at 557-58. At Havana, the word "relatively" was inserted
before "increased." This was not incorporated into the main text. However, the second
GATT session in 1948 made clear that this was the proper interpretation.
30 Id.
31 J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 561-63; Merciai, supra note 11, at 44.
2 See supra note 31.
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C. The Nature of Permitted Safeguard Action
Once the above prerequisites are met, an injured party may impose
quantitative import restrictions or suspend, withdraw or modify the nego-
tiated concession applicable to the domestic product."3
The escape clause action provided for in article XIX is meant to be
temporary in nature. Article XIX was included to allow specific industries
which have been adversely affected by sudden increases in competition to
shelter behind temporary protective measures while the industry adjusts
and improves production.3' The understanding that these should be in-
terim measures is not expressly stipulated in the article. It can be logi-
cally deduced, but it is not an enforceable obligation. Further, there is no
requirement that remedial action be taken by the invoking party, thus
the status quo may be maintained. Notice and consultation with trading
partners affected by the safeguard measures is required, however, and
this adds a degree of permanency to the agreement concluded and the
measures imposed.3 5
One of the most controversial points in the application of article XIX
has been whether the basic GATT most favored nation (MFN) or non-
discriminatory treatment standard applies. Indeed, it was on this issue of
selectivity the multilateral trade negotiation's Safeguard Code foun-
dered."s A departure from the GATT MFN was a precondition to EEC
negotiation of a safeguard code.3 7 It is generally agreed38 that measures
taken under this article are subject to the rules of non-discrimination
found in articles I, H and XIII of the GATT. Thus, there is an implicit
prohibition of selective measures in the original system, in conformity
with the established GATT principle of equality of treatment.3 9 The ac-
tion taken must conform to the MFN rule and thus there are likely to be
a number of aggrieved parties seeking compensation or who are able to
invoke retaliatory measures. The non-discrimination policy requires a
Contracting Party taking article XIX action to negotiate with all export-
Specific action is not stipulated within article XIX. However, some support does ex-
ist for this premise. See K. DAm, supra note 14, at 105-06; J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 564-
66; Merciai, supra note 11, at 45.
For further discussion, see D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 20.
85 Id.
86 See generally Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 125-35.
3, C. BERGSTEN & W. CLNE, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's, at 35 (1982); Curzon-Price,
Surplus Capacity and What the Tokyo Round Failed to Settle, 2 WORLD ECONoMY 305, 311
(1979); Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 126.
' Merciai, supra note 11, at 45; see also K. DAM, supra note 14, at 104; J. JACKSON,
supra note 19, at 564; D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 21; Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 87
n.20. Contra Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Application of Article XIX GATT: Tra-
dition or Fiction?, [1981] 2 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 35, 46-48.
89 Merciai, supra note 11, at 45 n.21.
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ers of that product.40 The importing state may offer compensation in the
form of MFN concessions on individual products exported by affected
parties; however, it is frequently difficult to come to an agreement with
all concerned parties. This situation must be contrasted with the applica-
tion of VER's where the importing country will normally deal with only
one exporter. Thus, compensation must only be made to one party, or not
at all.
As it is often difficult to reach a compensatory settlement with all
concerned, a Contracting Party invoking article XIX may be faced with
retaliatory action such as the withdrawal of a concession, or the imposi-
tion of import quotas on its products. This makes the application of arti-
cle XIX less attractive and the option of resorting to measures outside
the GATT framework very appealing, particularly when the source of dis-
ruption can be readily identified. Similarly, it makes the selective applica-
tion of safeguard provisions seem very desirable; an example is the with-
drawal of lesser developed country (LDC) preferences by Australia.41
Furthermore, there is no provision in article XIX which requires the
invoking country to limit the measure taken to ensure that the pre-safe-
guard level of imports will at least be maintained. The importing country
is not prohibited from reducing its imports to a level below that which
was previously in existence. The only constraint on such action is the fear
of retaliation or the cost of compensation. The major sanction of article
XIX can thus be found in the principle of balanced advantages. The im-
porter wishing to invoke article XIX may quickly be dissuaded from this
remedy once the cost of retaliation or compensation is considered.
Apart from the relatively subjective criteria used to invoke article
XIX, one of the major shortcomings of the article is that it does not re-
quire the invoking party to take remedial action to address the cause of
its domestic difficulties. Therefore, it permits a restraint which decreases
trade and overall global productivity without imposing a concomitant ob-
ligation to address the structural problems within the economy.
Another controversy associated with the application of article XIX
relates to both the use of selective criteria and the use of VER's and
OMA's. In essence, the issue is whether such measures may be taken on
40 GATT, supra note 2, at A59, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 55, 55 U.N.T.S. at 260 (article
XIX(2)).
41 For example, in Oct. 1983, Australia withdrew the developing country tariff prefer-
ence accorded imports of certain iron or steel stranded wire, cables, cordage and ropes from
the Republic of Korea. Imports of these items from Korea are now subject to a 20 percent
duty while imports from other developing countries remain duty free. Joint Statement by
Hon. Lionel Bowen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, and Senator John But-
ton, Minister for Industry and Commerce (Oct. 4, 1983) (media release); see also INusTms
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION REPORT, STRANDED WIRE, CABLES, CORDAGE, ROPES, ETC., OF IRON OR
STEEL WIRE (DEVELOPING COUNTRY PREFERENCES) 14-16 (Apr. 22, 1983).
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the basis that article XIX simply does not cover the fact situations in
which these measures are invoked.42 There is no doubt that GATT mem-
bers are resorting to these measures,'43 but such state practice does not
resolve the question of their legality under GATT.
D. Summary Critique of-Article XIX
There are four major criticisms which can be levied against the
formula laid down in article XIX.4" First, it fails to define what consti-
tutes a serious injury. This permits a broad interpretation and does not
ensure that article XIX is only invoked when necessary. Second, although
it is apparent that article XIX was perceived as a temporary measure,
there is no provision that makes such temporary application mandatory,
hence measures may be applied for lengthy periods of time. Third, there
is no guarantee that once measures are imposed that imports from af-
fected parties will be maintained at least at the level achieved prior to the
application of article XIX. Moreover, from the proliferation of arrange-
ments operating outside of the GATT today, it is evident that govern-
ments are increasingly hesitant to apply article XIX because it it likely to
be a costly proposition. The importing country will have to negotiate with
the affected trade partners and offer compensation in the form of
equivalent concessions or else face the withdrawal of concessions previ-
ously made by its trading partners. Last, there is no guarantee that the
importing state will ensure that the affected domestic industry will take
action to improve production efficiency, or that the importing state will
relocate. In effect, the status quo ante will be maintained at considerable
cost to both exporters and the importing country.
Insofar as article XIX is incapable of coping effectively with large
increases in imports, states have turned to VER's and OMA's. The EEC
and individual Member States have not only used VER's and OMA's to
protect their markets,'45 but the EEC has also enacted Regulation 288/82
42 Flory, Commerce, 24 ANNUAiE FRANAIS D DRorr INTERNATIONAL 613, 619 (1978).
Flory asserts that VER's and OMA's fall outside the scope of GATT. However, because the
GATT allows such an obvious OMA as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, infra note 63, it is
arguable that such arrangements fall within GATT. Thus, not only should such arrange-
ments be notified to the Contracting Parties, they should also be approved by the Con-
tracting Parties in order to avoid a violation of GATT norms.
4 See generally Green, supra note 23, at 5-7; Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 112-17.
" These criticisms are largely derived from D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 55-56; and
MacBean, supra note 4, at 155-56.
4" For example, such restrictions have been imposed on: (1) footwear imports from Ko-
rea to the United Kingdom and Ireland (1978-82); (2) flatwear from Japan to the Benelux,
Germany and the United Kingdom (1978-82); (3) black-and-white televisions from Japan to
the United Kingdom (1980-82); and (4) manioc and tapioca from Thailand to the EEC in
general (1982-86). GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE, NOTIFICATION, CONSULTA-
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to control imports and restrict trade. The following sections will analyze
this regulation and test it for potential violations of EEC obligations
under the GATT.
III. EEC COUNCIL REGULATION ON COMMON RULES FOR IMPORTS:
REGULATION 288/82
A. Background
In February of 1982, the EEC promulgated Regulation 288/82,46 enti-
tled "Common Rules for Imports." This Regulation establishes a new
EEC regime for the application of protective measures such as import
surveillance and safeguards. The enactment of this Regulation shortly af-
ter the termination of the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) is signif-
icant in light of the failure of the Contracting Parties at those negotia-
tions to agree either to a reform of article XIX or to a safeguards code.47
One of the principle issues at the Tokyo Round was whether selective
application of safeguards should be permitted, and under what condi-
tions.48 At the Tokyo Round, the EEC position favored a departure from
the GATT MFN principle. Indeed, it has been suggested that the EEC
considered this an absolute precondition to the establishment of a Safe-
guards Code.4' The U.S. position was less rigid. Although the United
States was initially against a departure from the MEN principle, the
United States may have been willing to consider selectivity on certain
conditions.50 Developing countries were understandably opposed to a se-
lective application of safeguards on the basis that they would likely be
the parties most directly affected by such measures.5 1 Japan was similarly
opposed to a selective application of safeguards.52 However, to say that
the issue of selectivity was the sole stumbling block in the safeguard ne-
gotiations at the Tokyo Round is misleading. Other controversial issues
were the establishment of a set of rules to separate fair imports from
other imports and the definitions of serious injury, market share, toler-
TIoN, DisirE SETTLEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, C/W/420, at 20-22
(June 27, 1983). See also Regulation 2050/83, infra note 89 (established in effect a VER);
Bronckers, supra note 23 (substantial restrictions imposed on Japanese automobile imports
under both VER's and OMA's many of which have been subsumed under Regulation 288/
82).
41 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12.
"' Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 120-21.
48 Id. at 125.
49 C. BERGSTEN & W. CLINE, supra note 37.
50 Id. at 35-36; see also Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 125-26 (discussion of the positions
taken by the Contracting Parties at the Tokyo Round).
" Merciai, supra note 11, at 56.
'2 See Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 126.
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ance for imports, etc.53 These are all matters that the Contracting Parties
have been unwilling to deal with substantively, except on an ad hoc
basis."'
The inability to agree on a safeguards code or on a reform of article
XIX has meant that the Contracting Parties have been left with the sta-
tus quo. The failure of the Tokyo Round negotiations prompted the EEC
to enact its own safeguards legislation in the form of Regulation 288/82.
The EEC no doubt carefully considered its options prior to promulgating
Regulation 288/82. However, faced with increasing competition in its own
markets, the continuing economic recession and internal political pres-
sures, the EEC decided to amend its policy on imports.
The Regulation was enacted pursuant to article 113 of the Treaty of
Rome,55 and forms part of a larger framework of a common export and
import policy for the EEC.56 It also purports to transpose into community
law the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 7 signed within the
GATT framework." The safeguard provisions are in many respects simi-
lar to article XIX. However, there are a number of provisions that distin-
guish it. The Regulation establishes a system of community investigation,
surveillance and safeguard measures on imports. 59 The latter are applied
when products are imported in "such greatly increased quantities and/or
on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial
injury to Community producers of like or directly competing products." 60
Regulation 288/82 is comprehensive legislation which focuses on im-
ports from non-state trading countries. 1 The point of departure is that
all imported products are free to enter the community, that is, they are
not subject to quantitative restrictions 2 This is substantially qualified by
Is Id. at 119-20.
4 See generally Lowenfield, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter, 13 CoRNEL INT'L
L.J. 205, 210-11 (1980).
0' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 113, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 60 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
6 See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No. 926/79 on common rules for imports, May 8,
1979, 22 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 131) 15 (1979); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1439/74 on
common rules for imports, June 4, 1974, 17 O.J. Eum. Comm. (No. L 159) 1 (1974). See
generally Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 1-2 (preamble).
" GATT, BISD 170 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
58 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 2 (preamble). Analysis of the preamble suggests
this was a secondary objective rather than the primary focus of the drafters.
80 Id. at 3-8 (arts. 6-18).
So Id. at 6-7 (arts. 15-16).
61 Id. at 2 (art. 1). State trading country exports are governed by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1765/82, June 30, 1982, 25 O.J. Euii COMM. (No. L 195) 1 (1982). The People's
Republic of China is dealt with separately under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/82,
June 30, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 195) 21 (1982).
62 Regulation 228/82, supra note 12, at 2 (art. 1(2)).
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providing that these products are subject to investigation, surveillance
and safeguard measures, and that national quota restrictions are
maintained.63
The drafters of Regulation 288/82 were faced with a dilemma: how
should they respond to protectionist measures in Europe while pursuing a
free trade policy for exports? Undoubtedly, Regulation 288/82 is a protec-
tive measure which restricts free trade. The potential effect on global
trade is serious. The EEC constitutes one of the world's largest markets.
Evidently, as a result, EEC commercial policies have a significant impact
on the global trade community. For this reason, Regulation 288/82 de-
mands attention.
An examination of the Regulation shows that legitimate areas of in-
ternational concern are: (1) the consultation mechanism and the investi-
gation procedure; (2) the implications that the surveillance system has for
products entering the EEC; (3) the basis for invoking safeguards under
the Regulation; and, (4) the compatibility of the Regulation with the
EEC's GATT obligations.
B. Consultation Procedure
The system of Community consultation, investigation and surveil-
lance provided for in Titles II, III and IV of Regulation 288/82 is in-
tended to alert the Commission of the European Economic Community
(Commission) to adverse trends in imports and to provide a framework
for the application of protective measures under Title V.
Title II provides for a community information and consultation pro-
cedure. The procedure is activated when a Member State informs the
Commission that a particular trend of imports calls for measures of sur-
veillance and/or protection." Consultations are to be held within eight
working days of such notification. It is mandatory that such consulta-
tions be held prior to the application of surveillance or safeguard mea-
sures." Consultation is undertaken by an advisory committee composed
63 Id. Although textiles "subject to specific common import rules" are excluded, they
are also subject to surveillance measures. Id. (art. 1). Such import rules include the Arrange-
ment Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No.
7340 [hereinafter cited as Multi-Fiber Arrangement].
" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 2 (art. 3). Article 3 provides:
The Commission shall be informed by the Member States should trends in im-
ports appear to call for surveillance or protective measures. This information shall
contain the available evidence on the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 9.
The Commission shall pass on this information to all the Member States
forthwith.
The article 9 criteria are discussed infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
65 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 2-3 (art. 4).
66 Id.
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of representatives of each Member State, with a Commission representa-
tive as chairman.17 Consultations may be in writing. When consultations
are held in writing, Member States may request oral consultations. 8 Dur-
ing such consultations the terms and conditions of importation, the eco-
nomic and commercial situation, and possible measures must all be con-
sidered.69 Upon the termination of the consultation between Member
States, a decision must be made whether to take investigatory steps, ap-
ply surveillance or safeguard measures, or maintain the status quo.70
The time frame permitted for these consultations and the conse-
quences thereof should be focused on briefly. In essence, Title II permits
the application of surveillance or safeguard measures subsequent to con-
sultation among Member States. 1 As consultations must be held within
eight working days of notification, measures may in effect be imple-
mented almost immediately.7 2 Consultations are purely an internal mat-
ter between EEC Member State representatives and a Commission repre-
sentative.73 No provision is made for representation of private importers
from within the Community, or for representation from outside the Com-
munity (i.e., non-EEC exporting states). Thus, Title II provides for uni-
lateral decisions to impose surveillance or safeguard measures subsequent
to brief consultation within the Community.
Article 7(4) of Regulation 288/82 makes it clear that it is not
mandatory for the Commission to proceed to the more extensive informa-
tion gathering process provided for in Title HI (investigation procedure)
before applying surveillance or safeguard measures.7 4 Since Title II does
not provide for outside consultation and requires that a decision be made
by the Commission within eight working days, both the quality and the
equity of the decisions are questionable. The very essence of safeguard
action is that it stems from a perceived or actual threat to imports. Thus,
the EEC must be able to take action quickly. However, what distin-
guishes the Regulation 288/82 provisions from other international trade
provisions is that the opportunity to question the correctness of the per-
ceived or actual emergency is limited. 5 The opportunity for external par-
"T Id. at 3 (art. 5(1)).
:S Id. (art. 5(4)).
Id. (art. 5(3)).
70 Id. (art. 7).
Id. (art. 5).
72 Id. at 2-3 (art. 4).
73 Id. at 3 (art. 5(1)).
74 Id. (art. 7). Article 7(4) provides: "The provisions of this Title [investigation proce-
dures] shall not preclude the taking, at any time, of surveillance measures in accordance
with Articles 10 to 14 or, in an emergency, protective measures in accordance with Articles
15 to 17."
" See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
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ties to have input into a decision to apply protective measures is virtually
non-existent; as a result, safeguard measures may be applied in circum-
stances that would otherwise not be acceptable in international trade.
C. Investigation Procedure
Title III is "new legislation" insofar as an investigation procedure
was not provided for in the predecessor regulation.7 6 When Title II con-
sultations have not led to the application of safeguards or surveillance
and the Commission believes that there is sufficient evidence to justify an
investigation, then under Title III an investigation will commence."" The
level of potential injury required to justify an investigation is not defined.
Article 6 provides that, subsequent to the decision to investigate, "the
Commission shall announce the opening of an investigation in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.7 8 This announcement is to be
supported by a summary of the information received, a request for fur-
ther information, and the announcement must establish a time frame for
interested parties to make their views known to the Commission.7 9 Article
6 also stipulates that members are to cooperate with the investigation,
and that information is to be verified if possible."0 Affected Member
States are to provide all possible information on market developments
regarding the product under investigation.8 1 The Regulation does not ex-
pressly provide a time frame for the investigation; it neither stipulates a
minimum or maximum period for submissions from interested parties,
nor does it state a time for the commencement of the investigation. In
two instances in which these provisions have been invoked the Commis-
sion has allowed a thirty-day period for the presentation of views by in-
terested parties.8 2 As this is a new regulation whose application has been
limited,8" it is inappropriate to generalize and to assume that this will
always be the case. The provision of an adequate period of time to re-
spond to the investigation procedure is of paramount importance, for the
failure to apply in writing in time implies that the right to a possible
hearing or oral presentation is lost.
76 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, repeals Council Regulation (EEC) No. 926/79 on
common rules for imports, May 8, 1979, art. 24, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 15 (1979).
7 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 3 (art. 6(1)).
78 Id. (art. 6(1)(a)).
70 Id.
:0 Id. (arts. 6(1)(b), 6(2)).
1 Id. (arts. 6(2), 6(3)).
82 See, e.g., 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 144) 3 (1982); 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 44) 4
(1983).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 203-60 for a discussion of the application of Regu-
lation 288/82 to date.
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In carrying out the investigation, the Commission may hear both nat-
ural and legal persons.84 To be heard, such persons must satisfy three
conditions. First, there must be an application in writing within the time
stipulated in the Official Journal announcement."s Second, parties must
be able to show that they are actually or likely to be affected by the out-
come of the investigation."6 Third, the parties must show that there are
special reasons for an oral hearing. 7 The basic rule appears to be that
there is no right to an oral hearing unless the parties have actually been
affected or are likely to be affected and have "special reasons." A "special
reason" is not defined; presumably the standard is established by the
Commission.
Only Member States have a right to question the decisions taken by
the Commission under this regulation.88 This right does not encompass a
review of the investigation procedure or the decision itself. The right is
limited to a referral to the EEC Council of decisions made pursuant to
article 15 (application of emergency safeguards).89 Upon such a referral
the Council must, by a qualified majority, either confirm, amend or re-
voke the Commission decision.90 If the Council fails to consider the mat-
ter within three months, the Commission decision is automatically
deemed revoked."' Referral to the Council of other decisions taken pursu-
ant to the Regulation is not envisaged. It may, however, be possible to
appeal decisions taken under this Regulation to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ).9 2 Interested parties such as Community importers and ex-
porters may have standing to bring a claim before the Court because they
have been "directly affected" by the Commission or Council decision.9
This, however, does not provide non-Member States with an opportunity
to be heard, as such states do not have standing before the ECJ.9'
Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 3 (art. 6(4)).
S3 Id.
"Id.
s7 Id.
Id. at 7 (art. 15(5)).
See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2050/83, July 21, 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. L 200) 43 (1983) (decision to revoke safeguards and establish, in effect, a VER, was
appealed by a Member State).
90 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 7 (art. 15(6)).
91 Id.
:2 Pursuant to article 173 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 55, an individual has the
right to appeal or question a regulation which has a direct effect. When a decision has a
direct effect, even though it is not cast in terms of direct applicability, an individual will
have standing to appeal the decision before the European Court of Justice. See Winter,
Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Commu-
nity Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 425, 432-34 (1972).
93 Treaty of Rome, supra note 55, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76 (article 173).
" id.
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Although consultation under Title II is mandatory, an investigation
is not prescribed prior to the application of safeguard or surveillance
measures. Article 7(4) provides that safeguard measures, temporary or
permanent, or surveillance measures, may be applied without a Title III
investigation. 5 Indeed, where safeguard action is taken under article 15,
the Commission must decide within a maximum of five working days
whether to maintain the safeguards or surveillance imposed. 6 This leaves
little time for affected parties to prepare a convincing case either in sup-
port of, or opposed to further measures. Title III does provide for an ex
post facto investigation where Title IV (surveillance) or Title V (protec-
tive) measures have been taken without prior investigation. Article 7(4)
states that the "Commission shall immediately take the investigation
measures it considers to be still necessary. 9 7 Results are to be used to re-
examine decisions or measures taken previously.98 The article leaves it
open to the Commission to decide that an investigation is not required;
the provision does not make an investigation mandatory. This implies
that, in some instances, even the already limited right to a hearing may
effectively be non-existent or denied. After Title IV (surveillance) or Title
V (protective) measures are taken pursuant to the Title IE consultations
within the "eight working days" provision or "five working days" provi-
sion of article 15, it is conceivable that there will be no reconsideration of
the measures.
In summary, the rights granted to outside parties under the investi-
gation procedure are limited. The structure of the legislation is such that
oral representations, and thus an opportunity to refute, deny, etc., are the
exception rather than the rule. Notice in the Official Journal may not be
sufficient to alert foreign exporters or non-Member States. There is no
guarantee that those who will be most affected will be aware of such a
",hearing.""9
The right to a hearing is only available to natural and legal persons.
There is no reference in the legislation to states other than Member
States. Do non-Member States have a right to be heard under Title In?
It would appear that this is not contemplated by the provisions. When
safeguards are applied and fall under the GATT article XIX, then clearly
states will have recourse through the normal article XIX mechanisms.
" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 7(4)). However, where protective mea-
sures are taken pursuant to articles 15, 16 or 17, then "the Commission shall immediately
take the investigation measures it considers to still be necessary." Id.
98 Id. at 6-7 (art. 15(4)).
Id. at 4 (art. 7(4)).
98 Id.
99 On the other hand, it must be assumed that importers who are aware of Regulation
288/82 will be closely watching the notifications published in the Official Journal pursuant
to article 6.
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However, Regulation 288/82 does not require that injury be caused by
GATT obligations or concessions. Thus, protective measures may be ap-
plied under the Regulation in circumstances that do not attract GATT
article XIX obligations. 100 The Regulation, then, does not afford non-
Member States an adequate opportunity to be heard. It is apparent that
the quality of the investigation procedure, whether initiated prior or sub-
sequent to the imposition of protective measures, is of questionable merit.
Regulation 288/82 does not impose an obligation on the Commission
to publicly report all of the findings or to disclose the basis of decision
under Title III. The Commission need only publish the decision itself and
major findings. 10 ' Subject to the comments made above pertaining to the
application for review by Member States of article 15 decisions,10 2 there
appears to be no opportunity to request a review of the findings or the
decision taken.
The issues raised above are important, for subsequent to the initial
investigation, the Commission must submit a report to the Advisory
Committee composed of Member States. This Committee will decide on
the basis of the information submitted whether safeguard or surveillance
measures will be applied or re-examined.10 3
It is instructive to contrast the Regulation 288/82 provisions with the
investigation procedure found in analogous EEC legislation, namely EEC
Regulation 3017/79 on dumping and subsidies enacted pursuant to the
revised GATT code.' 0 ' Regulation 3017/79 not only requires Official Jour-
nal publication upon the initiation of procedures, but also requires sepa-
rate notification to concerned exporters and importers, representatives of
exporting countries and the complainants.0 5 Further, Regulation 3017/79
requires an in-depth examination, including investigation in a third coun-
try if necessary.'0 6 This Regulation provides for the inspection of infor-
mation collected by parties to the investigation,' 0 7 and provides that,
100 The Regulation provides specific criteria for safeguard application which are differ-
ent from the conditions for invoking GATT article XIX. The Regulation's lower threshold
for injury demonstrates the potential for increased application of safeguards. See infra text
accompanying note 122. Already there are large numbers of controls and measures that fall
outside article XIX and which are deliberately utilized to avoid the article XIX consultation
procedure. See UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM, supra note 1; see also Bronckers, supra
note 38, at 43, 45.
101 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 7(2)).
102 See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
103 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 7(1)(3)).
104 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79 on protection against dumped or subsidized
imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community, Dec. 20, 1979,
22 O.J. Eva. CoMm. (No. L 339) 1 (1979).
105 Id. at 7 (art. 7(1)).
o Id. at 8 (art. 7(2)(b)).
107 Id. at 7 (art. 7(2)(a)).
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upon request, the concerned parties meet in order that "opposing views
may be presented and any rebuttal, argument [be] put forward."108 The
obligations found in Regulation 3017/79, that parties known to be af-
fected by the investigation be contacted, that information upon which the
decision is based be made public, and that the parties be given an oppor-
tunity to rebut, are all noticeably lacking in Regulation 288/82.109 Clearly,
when enacting Regulation 288/82 the EEC was not required to comply
with an internationally agreed upon code of conduct, as it was in the case
of Regulation 3017/79. However, even if one looks to the revised GATT
code as supplying a high international standard, it is still apparent that
Regulation 288/82 falls short of any minimum standard, domestic or in-
ternational, in providing affected parties with a reasonable opportunity to
present their case.
D. Surveillance
Title IV of Regulation 288/82 deals with Community surveillance110
and is intended to provide information on which to base decisions to in-
troduce safeguard measures under Title V. Surveillance may be invoked
"[w]here developments on the market in respect of a product originating
in a third country . ..threaten to cause injury to Community producers
of like or directly competing products." ' While safeguard measures may
only be applied where "substantial" or "serious" injury is threatened or
caused, surveillance measures may be applied where market develop-
ments "threaten to cause injury.' ' 1 2 This points to a lower threshold in-
jury for surveillance measures and thus facilitates the application of such
measures without extensive investigation.
Where surveillance is introduced concurrently with the liberalization
of imports of the product in question, the decision is to be made by the
Council instead of the Commission." 3 This is a precautionary measure to
oversee such liberalization of imports.
108 Id. at 8 (art. 7(6)).
109 In most decisions taken to date under Regulation 288/82, the Commission has in-
cluded figures and precentages in support of the decisions. See infra text accompanying
notes 207-60. However, this falls short of the Regulation 3017/79 obligation to provide af-
fected parties with an opportunity to inspect data and refute the same.
10 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 10(1)).
121 Id.
112 See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 6-7 (arts. 10, 15, 16).
I1 EEC imports are either liberalized or not liberalized. The distinction reflects the
applicability of quantitative restrictions to the product in question. The rule is somewhat
arbitrary, however, for it merely relates to whether any Member State had restrictions on
those goods when the common imports regime was finalized. A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, EEC
LAw 449 (1981).
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Surveillance may be prior or retrospective surveillance." 4 Subject to
provisions to the contrary, surveillance measures are to be of limited du-
ration.115 Prior surveillance is applied before a decision is taken to apply
safeguards, and implies that goods can only be imported and put into free
circulation if an import document is produced.11 Such import documents
are not meant to constitute a trade barrier, and must be freely issued
when the importer provides certain basic information.1"7 The import doc-
umentation is, however, only of limited duration, and may make importa-
tion more difficult because of the recurring need to supply such informa-
tion to obtain a license.
It is apparent from Regulation 288/82 that the "country of origin" of
products is a concern to the EEC in enacting import controls. Provision is
made in the Regulation to require importers to provide certificates of ori-
gin.' This provision ensures that attempts to reroute goods to avoid or
circumvent licensing provisions will not be successful.
National prior surveillance may be applied where a member has noti-
fied the Commission of a potential situation requiring surveillance or pro-
tective measures and where no decision has been taken within eight work-
ing days by the Commission.'1 The form of surveillance is essentially the
same as Community surveillance. This highlights the fact that one of the
Regulation's objectives is to provide a procedure for quick safeguard
action.
The comments made above pertaining to the article 3 time frame for
action,' 20 and the relatively low threshold for initiating safeguard or sur-
veillance measures must be kept in mind when assessing the surveillance
provisions. Surveillance measures constitute a valuable tool to protect the
economy. They permit and facilitate a careful monitoring of the market
and can be activated almost immediately. 2 1 They represent a barrier to
an increase in imports, for surveillance acts as a warning to those who
might otherwise contemplate an increase in their exports to the EEC. It
can almost be considered a measure which forces states to undertake a
truly "voluntary" export restraint, out of the fear of having either a re-
straint or a Regulation 288/82 safeguard measure imposed. For this rea-
son, the surveillance procedure may be considered tantamount to a deter-
rent safeguard.
n4 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 10(1)(a)(b)).
115 Id. at 5 (art. 10(2)(3)).
118 Id. (art. 11).
12 Id. This provision reflects the requirements found in article 2 of the Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, supra note 57, at 171.
218 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 5 (art. 11).
119 Id. (art. 12).
"2 See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
221 Id.
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E. The Grounds Required to Invoke Regulation 288/82
A significant inclusion in the Title III (investigation) provisions is
article 9,122 which establishes the indicia that determine whether there
has been a substantial injury or threat of substantial injury. The factors
to be considered under article 9(1) include:
(a) the volume of imports... either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the Community;
(b) the prices of imports, in particular where there has been a signif-
icant price undercutting as compared with the price of a like product in
the Community;
(c) the consequent impact on Community producers of similar or di-
rectly competitive products, as indicated by trends in certain economic
factors such as: production, utilization of capacity, stocks, sales, market
share, prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention of price increases
which would normally have occurred), profits, return on capital em-
ployed, cash flow, [and] employment.12
The list of criteria enumerated in article 9 is not exhaustive; examination
of the criteria listed by the Commission is a mandatory and minimal re-
quirement.124 This requirement must be considered within the context of
the article 6(5) provision, namely that where information is not provided
within a reasonable time, or where the investigation is significantly im-
peded, findings may be made on the facts available.125 What constitutes a
"reasonable time," or what is meant by the investigation being "signifi-
cantly impeded," is not defined. This leaves a wide margin of discretion
to the Commission, and leaves open the question to what extent the indi-
cia are applied in actual practice.
Moreover, article 9(2) provides that where "threat of serious injury"
is alleged under Title IV (surveillance), the Commission must also ex-
amine whether it is likely to develop into actual injury.12  Factors to be
taken into account include "the rate of increase of exports to the Commu-
nity," current and possible future export capacity in the country of origin,
'" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4; see also infra notes 133-64 and accompany-
ing text.
'" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4.
114 Id. Article 9(1) provides, inter alia: "The examination of the trend of imports...
shall cover in particular the following factors .... " The terminology employed appears to
indicate that, although the factors enumerated must be considered, others may also be
taken into account.
125 Id. at 3 (art. 6(5)). The full text of this article provides: "Where the information
requested by the Commission is not supplied within a reasonable period, or if the investiga-
tion is significantly impeded, findings may be made on the basis of the facts available."
126 Id. at 4 (art. 9(2)). In contrast, article XIX of the GATT does not require a consid-
eration of such development; the potential for injury is sufficient to trigger its operation.
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and the likelihood of the resulting exports going to the Community.127
Article 9 establishes substantive criteria for import controls in the
EEC." 8 The comprehensive list of criteria provided, and the requirement
that development into actual injury be examined,1 29 make this article
unique. One of the criticisms levied against article XIX of the GATT has
been that the vague wording of the article makes its application very sub-
jective, and permits use in situations where safeguard action would not
otherwise be warranted."30 Article 9 of Regulation 288/82 attempts to ad-
dress this problem. At the same time, however, it must be noted that the
large number of factors which are to be considered by the Commission
permit an easy justification for the application of Title IV (surveillance)
or Title V (protective) measures. This is not to say that the enumeration
of such criteria is not an improvement, for it does set some limits on the
factors which may form the basis for a Regulation 288/82 decision. Deter-
minations made under Regulation 288/82 appear to have taken at least
some of the criteria into account."'
Nonetheless, complainants are still faced with a problem similar to
the one found in article XIX-there is no definition of key terms such as
"substantial injury or threat of substantial injury."'132 The "substantial
injury" standard found in the Regulation is wider and more easily appli-
cable than its GATT counterpart of "serious injury." Although it is diffi-
cult to establish a dividing line between a "substantial" and a "serious"
injury, each sets a separate standard. Even if the difference is only one of
degree, the nature and ramifications of safeguard 'action make the dis-
crepancy significant. An injury may be substantial but fall short of being
a serious injury. The EEC standard facilitates the application of safe-
guards more readily than its GATT counterpart. If the Regulation's
threshold was higher, then there would be no need for concern. But in
light of the EEC's economic strength and commitments to the GATT,
such a derogation from the GATT standard has significant trade
implications.
F. Protective Measures
Under Title V there are two major safeguard provisions-articles 15
and 16.3 Article 15(1) permits the Commission to take interim emer-
"' Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9(2)).
12 See supra note 123 and accompanying text,.
129 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9(2)).
130 Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 117-18.
"I See infra notes 207-60 and accompanying text.
232 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9(1)).
131 The full text of articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 288/82 supra note 12, at 6-7, are as
follows:
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gency safeguard measures in "critical" situations. Article 16 envisages
Article 15
1. Where a product is imported into the Community in such greatly increased
quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause,
substantial injury to Community producers of like or directly competing products,
and where a critical situation, in which any delay would cause injury which it
would be difficult to remedy, calls for immediate intervention in order to safe-
guard the interests of the Community, the Commission may, acting at the request
of a Member State or on its own initiative:
(a) limit the period of validity of import documents within the meaning of
Article 11 to be issued or endorsed after the entry into force of this measure;
(b) alter the import rules for the product in question by providing that it
may be put into free circulation only on production of an import authorization,
the granting of which shall be governed by such provisions and subject to such
limits as the Commission shall lay down pending action, if any, by the Council
under Article 16.
The measures referred to in (a) and (b) shall take effect immediately.
2. Where the establishment of a quota constitutes a withdrawal of liberalization,
account shall be taken in particular of:
-the desirability of maintaining, as far as possible, traditional trade flows,
-the volume of goods exported under contracts concluded on normal terms
and conditions before the entry into force of a protective measure within the
meaning of this Title, where such contracts have been notified to the Commission
by the Member State concerned,
-the need to avoid jeopardizing achievement of the aim pursued in establish-
ing the quota.
3. (a) The measures referred to in this Article shall apply to every product which
is put into free circulation after their entry into force. They may be limited to
imports intended for certain regions of the Community.
(b) However, such measures shall not prevent the putting into free circula-
tion of products already on their way to the Community provided that the desti-
nation of such products cannot be changed and that those products which, under
Articles 10 and 11 may be put into free circulation only on production of an im-
port document are in fact accompanied by such a document.
4. Where intervention by the Commission has been requested by a Member
State, the Commission shall take a decision within a maximum of five working
days of receipt of such request.
5. Any decision taken by the Commission under this Article shall be communi-
cated to the Council and to the Member States. Any Member State may, within
one month following the day of communication, refer such decision to the Council.
6. If a Member State refers the decision taken by the Commission to the Coun-
cil, the Council shall, by a qualified majority, confirm, amend or revoke the deci-
sion of the Commission.
If within three months of the referral of the matter to the Council, the latter
has not given a decision, the measure taken by the Commission shall be deemed
revoked.
Article 16
1. Where the interests of the Community so require, the Council may, acting by
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, adopt appropriate
measures:
(a) to prevent a product being imported into the Community in such greatly
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more permanent safeguard or protective measures which are instituted by
Council and are thus tantamount to community laws.
Protective measures may be applied "[w]here a product is imported
into the Community in such greatly increased quantities and/or on such
terms and conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial injury
to Community producers of like or directly competing products. ' 134 This
standard applies to both article 15 and article 16. Measures may be taken
at the Community level, nationally or regionally.
Under article 15, when importation leads to a situation which may be
deemed "critical" and which would be "difficult to remedy," immediate
protective measures may be taken by the Commission. 135 Such measures
include a limitation on the validity of import documentation, or an altera-
tion of the import rules for the product in question.""6 The former may be
achieved by making free circulation of the product subject to an import
authorization of such other provisions and regulations as set out by the
Commission. 37 The latter gives the Commission authority to take any
measures that it deems appropriate, including, for example, a ban or se-
vere restriction on the import of a particular product. 38 Although article
15 is supposed to be an interim measure until article 16 action is taken,"9
no time limit is placed on the validity of such action. The article 15 provi-
sion seems broader than the GATT rules which allow immediate action
only where prior consultation is not possible or when circumstances are
critical."0 Although the GATT requirement of a "critical situation" is an
apparent prerequisite to article 15 action, the EEC conditions to such in-
vocation are less onerous, as is the substantive test of injury."' A Com-
mission decision to act under article 15 must be forthcoming within five
working days. 142 This provides for quick action. It must also raise ques-
tions as to whether an adequate data base is available for such a decision.
increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to
cause, substantial injury to Community producers of like or directly competing
products;
(b) to allow the rights and obligations of the Community or of all its Mem-
bers States to be exercised and fulfilled at international level, in particular those
relating to trade in primary products.
2. Article 15 (2) and (3) shall apply.
134 Id. at 6 (art. 15(1)).
285 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (art. 15(1)(b)).
139 Id.
140 GATT, supra note 2, at A59, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 55, 55 U.N.T.S. at 260 (art.
XIX(2)).
141 See infra notes 207-60 and accompanying text.
"' Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6-7 (art. 15(4)).
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The threshold for what constitutes a "critical" injury (article 15(1)),
as opposed to what is "substantial" injury (article 16), is not defined. The
former is evidently a higher standard, but how much higher is not clear.
When article 15 measures are applied by the Commission, there is no
guarantee that an investigation will be held. 143 Thus, safeguard measures
may be applied with very little investigation and possibly with little
justification.
Article 16 provides for substantive and long term action by the Coun-
cil upon the recommendation of the Commission. Like GATT article
XIX, no time limit is placed on the duration of the measures taken. Arti-
cle 16(1)(a) provides that, where Community interests require, the Coun-
cil may adopt appropriate measures "to prevent a product [from] being
imported into the Community in such greatly increased quantities and/or
on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial
injury to Community producers of like or directly competing products ." 44
Articles 15(1), 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) are all subject to article 15(2)
and 15(3) provisions.145 Pursuant to article 15(3), protective measures
taken under articles 15 or 16 apply prospectively. Goods already enroute
to the EEC which cannot be intercepted and rerouted may enter the com-
munity on pre-safeguard terms.146 Goods may also be limited to certain
regions within the community.247 The provision which permits goods al-
ready in transit to enter the community is important because it gives
both exporters and importers at least some degree of certainty and avoids
an abrupt cutoff in supply.
Pursuant to article 15(2),'148 where an article 15 or 16 protective
"measure" constitutes a "withdrawal of liberalization," additional factors
must be taken into account. These include: "[T]he desirability of main-
taining ... traditional trade flows, the volume of goods exported under
contracts concluded on normal terms and conditions before the entry into
force of a protective measure [and] the need to avoid jeopardizing
achievement of the aim pursued in establishing the quota.' 149 The poten-
tial impact of this provision should not be underestimated, and it is note-
worthy that the provision applies to both article 15 (emergency) and arti-
cle 16 (permanent or semi-permanent) measures. Article 15(2) reflects the
EEC's desire not to upset established trade flow volumes in its applica-
143 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
144 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 7 (art. 16(1)(a)).
145 Id. at 6 (art. 15(2)(3)). Article 16(1)(b) is discussed infra notes 183-90 and accompa-
nying text.
M Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6 (art. 15(3)(b)).
147 Id. (art. 15(3)(a)).
148 Id. (art. 15(2)).
149 Id.
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tion of quantitative restrictions. 150 The article also points up the EEC's
position at the Tokyo Round on the selective application of safeguards. 151
The article reflects the EEC's need to prevent market disruption by
overly efficient producers from outside the Community. The problems of
justifying such selective safeguards are numerous, and have been dis-
cussed elsewhere at great length. 52 Thus, only a few points will be raised
in this regard.
The issue of selective safeguards touches the very core of GATT by
calling into question two key GATT concepts, namely, reciprocity and
MFN treatment. As discussed above, one reason that resort to article
XIX has been considered unpalatable is that the GATT principles re-
quire all states affected by the withdrawal or alteration of a GATT obli-
gation to be compensated. 53 Selectivity runs counter to this MFN princi-
ple by implying that safeguards will only be applied to one state, and
presumably to the most disruptive state. As a result, it will only be neces-
sary to compensate one state instead of a host of states and therefore will
be less costly for the invoking party.
States which are most likely to be faced with selective safeguard ac-
tion are developing or newly industrialized countries which have gained a
comparative advantage in labor intensive industries. Selective safeguards
permit less efficient producers of the same product to enter the market."5
The argument in support of non-discriminatory treatment is that it pro-
tects the economically weak or smaller states by requiring the invoking
state to compensate all states adversely affected, thereby discouraging re-
sort to safeguards. 155 In light of their relative lack of economic strength in
global trade, such states do not have the bargaining power to demand
compensation when faced with selective safeguards. Compensation is un-
likely to be offered if the affected state has no capacity to retaliate. Fur-
ther, GATT MFN principles not only make states reluctant to impose
safeguards due to the greater number of states likely to be affected, but
also ensure that there will be greater interest in, and hence pressure ex-
erted upon, the invoking state to revoke the restrictions imposed.
The Regulation 288/82 provision that "traditional trade flows and
volume" be respected implies that safeguards are to be applied to new
entrants into the market.'56 Practice substantiates this implication. 57 In
150 Id.
"' See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
151 C. BERGSTEN & W. CLMn, supra note 37, at 35-37; Curzon-Price, supra note 37, at
311-12; Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 127-35.
253 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
1" Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 129.
105 Id. at 128.
" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6 (art. 15(2)).
257 See infra notes 233-60 and accompanying text.
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economic terms, products from old- and new markets may be substituted.
There is no economic reason for distinguishing between the two. The re-
sult of such discrimination against new sources is more severe than the
imposition of quantitative restrictions. 158 It has been suggested that "ex-
port markets can... be viewed as [an] international commons," and that
when this "[international] commons becomes overcrowded, there is no
reason for the traditional suppliers to have prior claim... at the expense
of new suppliers."'159 Regulation 288/82 impedes new supplier access to
the EEC market, and thus runs counter tb the free trade philosophy of
comparative advantage. The Regulation also runs counter to the recogni-
tion under the GATT of the claims of developing countries to an equita-
ble share of world trade. 60 Nor does it sit happily with the EEC's own
policies under its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),' which assumes
that the EEC has a right to a share of markets traditionally the preserve
of other less powerful countries.'62
It would be incorrect to blame the EEC alone for the global increase
in protectionist mechanisms. However, there is no doubt that given the
size of the EEC market, any disruption of normal market forces by the
EEC increases the pressure on third country markets. This in turn will
cause a protectionist reaction and claims of market disruption or dump-
ing by the target countries. It can also be argued that selective safeguards
give third exporting countries an opportunity to expand their share of the
EEC market by filling the vacuum left by the restricted country. 63 It will
only be a matter of time before such exporting countries will be faced
with safeguard measures, VER's or OMA's. This will lead to a further
downward spiralling of trade.'64
1. The Compatibility of Regulation 288/82 Protective Measures
with GATT Obligations
The selective application of safeguards permitted by Regulation 288/
82 raises important interlocking issues. Those who oppose selective safe-
guards claim they run counter to the GATT MFN principle, and as a
188 C BERGSTEN & W. CLINE, supra note 37, at 36.
18 Id.
160 GATT, BISD 203 (26th Supp. 1978-79).
161 For a discussion of the legal foundations of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy,
see A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, supra note 113, at 206-15.
162 Villian, Address on Agriculture and Foreign Policy (University of Minnesota), cited
in A. BURNETr, AUSTRALIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE 1980's, at 104 n.40
(1983); Tangermann, What is Different About European Agricultural Protectionism?, 6
WORLD ECONOMY 39, 41-47, 50-56 (1983).
163 Sauermilch, supra note 8, at 128.
164 Id.
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result, the EEC is potentially in breach of GATT obligations.165 This view
must be tested against the argument that, if the "substantial injury" is
not caused by GATT tariff concessions or other obligations, then article
XIX does not apply and selective safeguards, OMA's and VER's are
permissible.'"6
The second viewpoint cannot be maintained. The GATT does not
permit the invocation of safeguards in situations unrelated to specific
GATT obligations, or in a selective manner, or on the basis of a "substan-
tial" injury test. 67 In this respect, EEC regulation 288/22 constitutes a
significant derogation from GATT obligations. It can be argued that the
EEC, by enacting Regulation 288/82, has unilaterally altered its obliga-
tions under a multilateral treaty. Regulation 288/82 changes the standard
for safeguard application,6 permits protective measures to be applied se-
lectively, 69 and fails to provide adequate consultation procedures before
or after the imposition of such measures. 70 It is a generally accepted
norm of customary international law that where treaty modifications are
introduced by signatories, there should be notification and consultation.
This norm has most recently been expressed in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.' 7 ' Thus, Regulation 288/22 constitutes a substantial
change in the article XIX obligations that the Community has
undertaken.
M To facilitate this'analysis it is assumed that the EEC is bound by GATT obligations.
Such an assumption is based on the Member States' delegation of their commercial powers
to the EEC under article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 55. The EEC may be
considered to have succeeded to the obligations of individual Member States by a process of
subrogation. This transfer of powers has been supported in practice both within and outside
of the GATT. In this regard, the EEC participated in the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo
Rounds of negotiation. Although not technically a member of the GATT, over time the EEC
has attained a separate status within the GATT, and can be bound by GATT obligations de
facto if not de jure. In support of this assumption, see Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, GATT, BISD 8, 27 (26th Supp. 1978-79); Agreement on Government Procurement,
GATT, BISD 33, 52 (26th Supp. 1978-79); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,
GATT, BISD 154, 160 (26th Supp. 1978-79); and Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat,
GATT, BISD 84, 89 (26th Supp. 1978-79) which define the term "governments" to include
the competent authorities of the EEC. See also International Fruit Company NV v.
Producktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 1227 (by conferring
powers inherent in trade policy on the EEC, Member States showed desire to have EEC
bound by GATT obligations); Kapteyn, The "Domestic" Law Effect of Rules of Interna-
tional Law within the European Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-
Executing Character of GATT Rules, 8 INT'L LAw. 74, 74-77 (1974).
166 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
1" Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6-7 (art. 15).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 8 (art. 18).
17 Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 40,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 694-95 (1969).
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The extent of this unilateral shift from GATT article XIX can be
measured both by the criteria adopted in the body of Regulation 288/82
and by a brief examination of Regulation 288/82 to date.
2. Comparison of GATT Article XIX with Regulation 288/82
Criteria
Article 16(1)(a) is the main safeguard provision found within Regula-
tion 288/82. Article 15 focuses on temporary emergency action, while arti-
cle 16 indicates that more permanent measures are envisaged.12
Despite the long list of criteria enumerated in article 9 to determine
injury,173 the terminology of article 16 suffers from the same difficulties as
article XIX.1 4 What constitutes "substantial injury" is not defined. In
addition, this provision is applicable not only where substantial injury is
caused, but also where it is "threatened to [be] caused. 175 The EEC pro-
vision does attempt to set a standard and provide criteria for establishing
injury. By providing a more objective standard, article 16 is a significant
improvement over the GATT provision. At the same time, the Regula-
tion's threshold for injury is lower than the GATT threshold.
Attention must be drawn to the fact that article 9 makes separate
provision for a "threat of serious injury." The likelihood that the
threatened injury will develop into actual injury must be considered by
the Commission, as must the rate of increase in imports, export capacity,
and the likelihood that the products will be sent to the EEC.178 This pro-
vision tends to tighten the article 9 criteria; it also reinforces the point
that the regulation envisages a particular country as the source of the
increased imports. 7 7
One important point which must be raised when comparing article
XIX to articles 15, 16, and the article 9 criteria, is that the right to invoke
safeguard measures under Regulation 288/82 is not linked to the prior
trade preferences granted. 78 Therefore, the Regulation has a broader
base for application. Safeguard action under Regulation 288/82 does not
imply that a negotiated concession is the cause of the increase in imports
nor that it will be withdrawn. The Regulation refers solely to the imposi-
172 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 7 (art. 16(1)) (the Council may adopt appropri-
ate measures).
"I For an enumeration of the article 9 criteria, see supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
174 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
17 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 7 (art. 16(1)(a)).
170 Id. at 4 (art. 9(2)).
:77 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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tion of quantitative restrictions. 179 Trade liberalization measures and the
withdrawal of quantitative restrictions also fall under the purview of
GATT obligations under article XIX. i8 0 Any analogy is, however, limited
to quantitative restrictions in the form of quotas as Regulation 288/82
does not appear to contemplate tariff concessions .2 1 Although the Regu-
lation envisages safeguard action inter alia by way of quantitative restric-
tions, it does not require that those same quantitative restrictions be the
cause of injury. 8 2 This supports the contention that the standard for in-
voking article XIX is substantially higher than that required for safe-
guard action under article 16 or article 15.
G. Other Title V Protective Measures
Article 16(1)(b) provides as follows:
1. Where the interests of the Community so require, the Council may,
... adopt appropriate measures:
(b) to allow the rights and obligations of the Community or of all its
Member States to be exercised and fulfilled at [the] international level,
in particular those relating to trade in primary products.' 8'
This article is also subject to 15(2) and 15(3) discussed above.8 4 There
are two possible interpretations which may be given to the 16(1)(b) provi-
sion. Both interpretations may have been envisaged by the drafters of the
Regulation since they are not mutually exclusive. The first and most
straightforward construction of this provision is that it refers to bilateral
and multilateral treaties which have been concluded by the EEC with
other states, and in particular to those which relate to primary commodi-
ties.8 5 Article 16(1)(b) would permit the" EEC to amend these treaties
and presumably to conclude other agreements of this nature in the
future. L8
179Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6 (art. 15(1)(a)(b)).
180 GATT, supra note 2, at A58-59, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 54-55, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258-60
(art. XIX(a)(b)).
'81 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
182 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6-7 (art. 15).
183 Id. at 7 (art. 16(1)(b)).
18 See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
185 Examples of such treaties are the EEC's arrangement with Argentina regarding
trade in mutton and lamb, 23 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 275) 14 (1980), and the EEC's
fisheries agreement with Norway, 23 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 226) 47 (1980).
8'8 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 7 (art. 16(1)(b)). This interpretation is sup-
ported indirectly by article 17(1)(b), which provides that interim protective measures may
be taken by a Member State when this is provided for in a bilateral agreement with a third
country. Id. at 7.
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A second interpretation is provided by Edmund McGovern. 87 He
suggests that article 16(1)(b) enables the EEC to take retaliatory action
under article XIX(3) of the GATT. 88 That is, if the EEC is faced with
safeguard measures pursuant to article XIX then it can retaliate either
through the imposition of quantitative restrictions or via the withdrawal
of a tariff concession. Such action may also be taken by the EEC under
articles 113 and 114 of the Treaty of Rome.189 Measures to compensate
parties adversely affected by EEC safeguard action will also be negotiated
under these articles of the Treaty of Rome. That the latter points are
valid cannot be disputed; however, it is valuable to consider McGovern's
proposition that 16(1)(b) provides a basis for retaliation pursuant to
XIX(3), and that such measures include not only quantitative restrictions
but also the withdrawal of tariff concessions. 9 '
An examination of Regulation 288/82 in its entirety strongly suggests
that the only safeguard measures contemplated thereunder are quantita-
tive restrictions.1 91 In particular, articles 15(1), 16(1)(a) and 16(2), the
main safeguard provisions, refer to quotas rather than tariff concessions.
Furthermore, surveillance procedures consist of import licensing. 92 There
is no doubt article XIX provides for the withdrawal of tariff concessions
as a retaliatory measure. In addition, the EEC has authority to take such
measures under articles 113 and 114 of the Treaty of Rome. But whether
such measures are sanctioned by 16(1)(b) of Regulation 288/82 is not
clear. EEC practice to date has not dealt with the issue under this Regu-
lation. Thus it will be necessary to look at future practice to see how this
issue will be resolved. In the interim, the first construction is a viable one,
as is the McGovern construction limiting retaliation under XIX(3) to
quantitative restrictions.
Article 17(1)(a) allows a Member State, instead of the Commission,
to take interim protective measures unilaterally. A Member State may
require that a product has an import licence prior to being put into free
circulation.293 Such action may be taken if the article 15 conditions have
been met or if such action is justified by a protective clause in a bilateral
agreement. 94 In both instances a Member invoking article 17 must notify
the Commission. 95 Thereafter, the Commission must make a decision to
187 E. McGoVERN, supra note 20, at 243.
18 Id. at 243.
189 Treaty of Rome, supra note 55, 298 U.N.T.S. at 60.
"I E. McGovRN, supra note 20, at 244.
191 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 2 (art. 1(2)), at 4 (art. 9), at 6 (art. 15(2)(3)), at
7 (art. 16), at 9 (art. 20(4)). But see id. at 5 (art. 11(2)).
192 Id. at 5 (art. 11(1)).
198 Id. at 7 (art. 17(1)).
14 Id. (art. 17(1)(a)(b)).
195 Id. (art. 17(2)(a)).
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continue the measure or to adopt other measures pursuant to article 15
within five working days." 8 The Commission's decision overrides the
Member's decision; the state has a right of appeal to the Council. 197 The
article 17 provisions permit a state to bypass the article 3 consultation
procedure in the first instance where the increase in imports will cause or
is likely to cause a "critical situation." This is the same standard found in
article 15.
There is one final safeguard provision in the Regulation which will be
touched on briefly. Article 20 applies to products subject to national re-
strictions, and provides that a Member State, in "cases of extreme ur-
gency," may act unilaterally and without consultation to alter the na-
tional restrictions listed in Annex 1.19s The state may do so by decreasing
the quota, or refusing entry of the product.199 Alternatively, the state may
increase quota allocations.200 Subsequent to such action, the Member
State must notify the Commission and participate in consultation. 20 1 Bar-
ring a situation of "extreme urgency," the normal procedure under article
20 for altering quotas is to proceed via a consultation procedure similar to
the one found in article 3V202 There is no indication in the provision to
clarify what constitutes a situation of "extreme urgency." Thus, like arti-
cle 17, it appears to provide a quick means of unilaterally changing trade
agreements which have been negotiated previously.
IV. APPLICATION OF COMMON RULES FOR IMPORTS: REGULATION 288/82
In order to evaluate whether Regulation 288/82 constitutes yet an-
other barrier to free trade, and to better understand its operative effects,
it is important to look at its application to date. The Regulation has been
used as a protectionist tool to block excessive imports or overly competi-
tive goods through the use of safeguards, and also as an instrument to
discourage particular trading partners from considering an increase in
their imports into the EEC.
The Regulation was promulgated in early February of 1982. Since
then surveillance measures have been invoked ten times.203 Actual safe-
196 Id. (art. 17(4)).
'9 Id.; Council Decision concerning the introduction of protective measures applicable
to tube and pipe fittings of malleable cast iron originating in certain third countries and
imported into Italy, Mar. 28, 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 86) 22 (1983).
198 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 9 (art. 20(4)).
"' Id. (art. 20(4)(a)).
200 Id. (art. 20(4)(b)).
201 Id. (art. 20(4)(c)).
202 Id. (art. 20(2)).
203 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2303/82 introducing retrospective Community
surveillance of imports of certain steel products on first stage processing, Aug. 18, 1982, 25
O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. L 246) 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 2303/82]; Commission
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guards have been imposed in four instances. 04 In one case the safeguards
Regulation (EEC) No. 2417/82 introducing retrospective and Community surveillance of im-
ports of certain textile products originating in Tunisia and Morocco, Sept. 3, 1982, 25 O.J.
EuR. CoMM. (No. L 258) 8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 2417/82]; Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 3543/82 introducing Community surveillance of imports of
motorcycles originating in Japan, Dec. 21, 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 29 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Regulation 3543/82], repealed and included within Commission Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 653/83 introducing Community surveillance of imports of certain products
originating in Japan, Mar. 18, 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 77) 8 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation 653/83]; Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3544/82 introducing Com-
munity surveillance of imports of light commerical vehicles originating in Japan, Dec. 21,
1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 371) 31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3544/82],
repealed and included within Regulation 653/83, supra; Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
3545/82 introducing Community surveillance of imports of video tape recorders originating
in Japan, Dec. 21, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 371) 31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Regulation 3545/82], repealed and included within Regulation 653/83, supra; Commission
Regulation (EEC) No. 3605/82 making the import of certain textile products originating in
Argentina subject to Community surveillance, Dec. 30, 1982, 25 O.J. Er.M Comm. (No. L 376)
36 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3605/82], extended by Commission Regulation
(EEC) No. 1888/83 making the import of certain textile products in Argentina subject to
Community surveillance, July 11, 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 187) 31 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Regulation 1888/83]; Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3384/82 extending the
period of validity of retrospective control of imports of footwear into the Community, Dec.
9, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 356) 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3384/82];
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3386/82 extending the period of validity of Community
surveillance over imports of certain phosphate fertilizers, Dec. 9, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. Comm.
(No. L 365) 15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3386/82]; Commission Regulation
(EEC) No. 3385/82 extending the period of validity of community surveillance of imports of
certain motor vehicles, machine tools, colour television receptor apparatus and cathode-ray
tubes for colour television receivers, originating in Japan, Dec. 9, 1982, 25 O.J. Eun. Com.
(No. L 356) 14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3385/82].
204 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3528/82 introducing protective measures in re-
spect of imports into France and the United Kingdom of tableware and other articles of a
kind commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes, of stoneware, and terminating the
Community investigation procedure in respect of articles of common pottery, Dec. 23, 1982,
25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 369) 27 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3528/82], re-
pealed by Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 873/83 revoking the protective measures in
respect of imports into France and the United Kingdom of tableware and other articles of a
kind commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes, of stoneware, and introducing a system
of automatic authorization for imports of the products in question originating in or coming
from South Korea, Apr. 12, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 96) 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Regulation 873/83]; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3587/82 on the arrangements for im-
ports of certain textile products originating in Taiwan, Dec. 23, 1982, 25 O.J. Eum. Com.
(No. L 374) 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 3587/82], amended by Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No. 853/83, Mar. 28, 1983, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 98) 1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation 853/83]; Council Decision concerning the introduction of protective mea-
sures applicable to tube and pipe fittings of malleable cast iron originating in certain third
countries and imported into Italy, Mar. 28, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 86) 22 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Council Decision]; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 169/83 introducing
quantitative restrictions on the imports of certain categories of wood in France, Jan. 24,
1983, 26 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L 23) 26 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 169/83].
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imposed were removed and replaced by an agreement tantamount to a
voluntary export restraint.20 5 All measures have been imposed subsequent
to September 1982. Although no distinct pattern can be ascertained, it is
fair to say that the parties most affected by these measures have been
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.20 6 It should be noted that the latter two
countries may be considered newly industrialized countries, while Japan
is considered one of the most competitive exporters of manufactured
goods in the world market.
A. Surveillance Measures
In September of 1982, the Commission introduced retrospective sur-
veillance on the importation of certain steel products pursuant to articles
10 and 14 of Regulation 288/82.07 The decision to impose surveillance
was supported by statistical documentation provided by the Member
States.208 The date established that the market share of the import in
question had increased either nationally or within the Community, and
that production or sale of like products decreased within the affected
Member State and/or Community.209 These figures point to the use of the
article 9 criteria, and in particular to the provision to consider "the vol-
ume of imports... where there has been a significant increase either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the Commu-
nity."210 The Regulation then concluded that "the imports... threaten to
cause injury to Community producers of like products and it is in the
Community's interest to introduce Community surveillance."21'
The terminology employed here is noteworthy. Had the Regulation
provided that the imports threatened to cause "serious" injury the Com-
mission, pursuant to article 9(2) of Regulation 288/82, would have been
obliged to consider both the rate of increase of exports coming into the
Community and the export capacity of the country of origin. The latter is
difficult to establish. The avoidance of the use of the term "serious" in-
jury, or even "substantial" injury (the article 9(1) standard), points to the
205 Regulation 873/83, supra note 204.
:" See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
20 Regulation 2303/82, supra note 203.
203 Id. at 7-8 (preamble).
109 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/82 on common rules for imports from state-
trading countries, June 30, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 195) 1 (1982). For example, the
market share of imported iron and steel wire in the Federal Republic of Germany increased
from 15.4 percent in 1981 to 17.6 percent in 1982. During this same period, German produc-
tion of like products decreased from 253,887 tons to 66,415 tons. A similar decline in market
share occurred in the other steel products covered by the regulation. See Regulation 2303/
82, supra note 203, at 7-8 (preamble).
20 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9(1)(a)).
2" Regulation 2303/82, supra note 203, at 8 (preamble).
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difficulty the Commission would encounter in establishing this condition.
Although article 9(1) speaks of "substantial" injury, the Regulation im-
posing retrospective surveillance speaks only of "injury." This affirms
that the threshold level of injury for the application of surveillance, as
opposed to safeguard measures, is lower. That the goods in question are
steel imports accents the protected status that the European steel indus-
try enjoys.
In September of 1982, the Commission also introduced retrospective
surveillance pursuant to articles 10 and 14 of Regulation 288/82 on im-
ports of certain textile producers originating in Tunisia and Morocco. 212
The Regulation refers to consultations between Tunisia, Morocco and the
Community to stabilize the market, and the need to monitor and stabilize
the import of certain textile products in the "interests of security of pro-
duction and trade between the parties. 21 No statistical data is presented
in the Regulation in support of the decision to impose surveillance mea-
sures. The Regulation fails to acknowledge that an OMA has been con-
cluded between the parties, and that, as a result, retrospective surveil-
lance is being imposed. Nevertheless, the Annex 214 attached to the
Regulation would point to such an Agreement's existence. Governments
rarely publicize such agreements. The Annex stipulates specific quantities
of products that are under surveillance. Neither the annexes attached to
Regulation 288/82 which extend pre-existing surveillance measures and
quantitative restrictions, nor other surveillance measures enacted pursu-
ant to Regulation 288/82, provide such figures. Thus, this particular Reg-
ulation appears to have been introduced to implement an OMA between
the parties. Further, the lack of statistical documentation establishing
that injury has been sustained by the Community or the Member States
suggests that the Commission does not feel obligated to consider the arti-
cle 9 criteria or to substantiate or assert claims of injury prior to applying
Regulation 288/82 surveillance measures. Whether this is merely an ex-
ceptional instance, or foreshadows future similar unsubstantiated deci-
sions, is difficult to assess. In contrast, subsequent surveillance decisions
have indeed been supported by "proof' of injury sustained.215
In December of 1982, under article 10, retrospective surveillance of
the following Japanese products was imposed: certain motor vehicles, ma-
chine tools, color television reception apparatuses, cathode ray tubes for
212 Regulation 2417/82, supra note 203.
213 Id. at 8 (preamble).
214 Id. at 9-10 (Annex).
215 See, e.g., Regulation 3543/82, supra note 203 (imports of Japanese motorcycles ris-
ing to 91 percent market share); Regulation 3544/82, supra note 203 (imports of light com-
mercial vehicles reaching market shares between 60 and 80 percent in some Member
States); Regulation 3543, supra note 203 (imports of video tape recorders reaching an 80.5
percent market level during the first half of 1982).
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color television receivers, video tape recorders, light commercial vehicles
and certain motorcycles. 216 This surveillance was extended and amplified
to include quartz watches, forklift trucks and high fidelity equipment in
March 1983.211 In each instance surveillance was justified on the basis
that the imports were made "at relatively low prices, thereby depressing
the price levels and financial results of the Community industry, and
thereby threatening to cause injury to the Community producers of simi-
lar and competing products. ' 218 Surveillance was also made on the basis
that the market share of the exporter had increased over a particular pe-
riod of time.21 9 These criteria fall under the indicia found in article 9,220
and point to their usage and application to establish injury. Further, the
products affected are precisely those in which Japan enjoys a competitive
advantage, 221 and which are arguably produced most efficiently.
Argentinian textiles were placed under prior surveillance in January
1983.222 The reason for such surveillance was that the EEC's agreement
monitoring and limiting textiles had expired and was not being re-
placed.223 Stating that there was "a threat that imports of textile prod-
ucts ... will cause injury" to Community producers, and asserting a need
to adhere to non-discriminatory treatment, the Commission imposed
comprehensive surveillance procedures pursuant to articles 11 and 14.224
The reference to equal treatment 225 refers to the fact that the EEC had
put other suppliers under a special import regime (Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment).226 Surveillance was initially imposed for six months, and was ex-
tended for another six months on the basis that the threat continued to
persist.227
The other two surveillance measures deal with phosphates without
regard to source,228 and with footwear from the People's Republic of
China.22 9 Both extend surveillance measures already in existence.23 0 Con-
216 See supra note 215.
217 Regulation 653/83, supra note 203.
218 Id. at 8 (preamble).
219 Id.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
221 Shepherd, The Japanese Challenge to Western Europe's Crisis Industries, 4
WORLD ECONozt 375, 375-91 (1981).
222 Regulation 3605/82, supra note 203.
223 Id. at 36 (preamble).
224 Id.
222 Id.
228 Multi-Fiber Arrangement, supra note 63.
227 Regulation 1888/83, supra note 203.
228 Regulation 3386/82, supra note 203.
229 Regulation 3384/82, supra note 203.
220 See Commision Regulation (EEC) No. 440/77 establishing Community surveillance
over imports of certain phosphate fertilizers, Mar. 1, 1977, 20 O.J. Eup. CoMM. (No. L 58) 11
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tinued surveillance is founded on "considerable pressure exercised by im-
ports into the Community ...and the resultant threat of injury to the
Community producers of like or directly competing products. '23 '
These latter surveillance measures, invoked because of threat of in-
jury, do not use any substantive criteria to justify their application. There
is no data provided or alluded to that would substantiate a claim of po-
tential injury. Surveillance as applied to Tunisian, Moroccan and Argen-
tinian textiles, Chinese footwear and to steel products and phosphates
generally, may appear relatively harmless -from a protectionist perspec-
tive. But such surveillance does constitute a barrier to free trade. That
the justification for the application of surveillance in these circumstances
is not always substantiated suggests that such measures can be applied
almost indiscriminately and with frequency.
The surveillance of the steel products and Japanese products reflects
the concern felt by the EEC and many other western trading nations23 2
that domestic production is threatened by the more efficient Japanese
producers. This surveillance constitutes a warning or a deterrent safe-
guard to Japan and other efficient producers to stop increasing exports or
they will face the risk of article 16 or 15 safeguard action. These mea-
sures, of course, do not support the free" trade rhetoric so frequently es-
poused by the EEC and other major trading nations. Surveillance can be
said to constitute a psychological or implied barrier to trade.
*B. Protective Measures
Relatively little use has been made of the Regulation's safeguard
measures. However, the promulgation of Regulation 288/82 does not im-
ply a prohibition on the use of VER's or OMA's under articles 113 and
114 of the EEC Treaty. Thus, while safeguards may not have been ap-
plied, other agreements restricting trade may well have been negotiated
or imposed by the EEC. 2 3 It is common knowledge that many such agree-
ments exist between the EEC and its trading partners.23 4 Many of these
arrangements, however, are not publicized. Thus, as a result, the number
and extent of such agreements is difficult to ascertain. Additionally EEC
Member States have negotiated individually various "undertakings" in
areas such as motor vehicles, footwear and electronics. 5
(1977); Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 716/78 introducing Community surveillance of
imports of footwear, Apr. 7, 1978, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 94) 24 (1978).
2" Regulation 3386/82, supra note 203, at 15 (preamble); Regulation 3384/82, supra
note 203, at 13 (preamble).
222 Green, supra note 23, at 2, 5, 6.
23 See supra notes 45 and 212-13 and accompanying text.
22" See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
235 E. McGOVERN, supra note 20, at 244; Bronckers, supra note 23, at 674-79; Green,
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Pursuant to article 16, the Council has regulated Taiwanese imports
of textiles. 236 The Council has provided for quantitative import quotas
with annual increases, and focused on the problem of goods being re-
routed or transshipped in circumvention of the Regulation.2 3 7 Although
the original base for the annual quota levels was to be 125 percent of the
preceding calendar year's level of imports, this was subsequently modified
and changed to a permanent base year of 1980 for the length of the Regu-
lation (1983-86).2ss This modification effectively decreased the level of al-
lowable imports. The object of the Regulation is to "ensure the expansion
and orderly development of trade in textiles and gradual adjustment to
the supply needs of the markets."23 9 Clearly, the aim is to limit
Taiwanese imports significantly.
The scope of the provision is far-reaching, for not only does it regu-
late specific enumerated categories of textiles, but it also permits the ap-
plication of quantitative limits on other groups of textile products where
the annual increase of permitted imports is exceeded (permitted increases
vary between 0.2 and 3 percent). 4 0 This does not allow a great deal of
variation. Further, there is provision for a refusal of imports where im-
ports exceed the allowable level by 10 percent.2 41 This Regulation, then,
establishes a comprehensive framework for the regulation of Talwanese
textiles.
It should be noted that this determination represents a continuation
of import arrangements in force prior to December of 1982;242 there are,
however, substantive changes in the import allocations and presumably in
their application.243 This continuation explains why no mention is made
of a threat to cause substantial injury to Community producers of like or
directly competing products. The provision does not specify whether it
was enacted under article 16(1)(a) or (b). It would seem logical, in light of
the lack of justification of injury or threat thereof, and because it repre-
sents a continuation of a pre-existing agreement, that the provision falls
supra note 23, at 5-6; Hindley, supra note 1, at 316.
236 Regulation 3587/82, supra note 204. Taiwan is not a signatory to the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement, supra note 63.
2s7 Regulation 3587/82, supra note 204, at 2-3 (arts. 1-2) (establishing quotas); id. at 4
(art. 6) (dealing with goods re-routed in circumvention of the regulation).
:s Regulation 853/83, supra note 204, at 1 (art. 1).
19 Regulation 3587/82, supra note 204, at 2 (art. 2).
240 Id. at 3 (art. 3(1)).
241 Id. at 4 (art. 5).
242 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3020/77 on the arrangements for imports of cer-
tain textile products originating in Taiwan, Dec. 30, 1977, 20 O.J. EuR. ComM. (No. L 357)
51 (1977), extended by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 255/78 maintaining the arrangements
for imports into the Community of textile products originating in Taiwan, Feb. 7, 1978, 21
O.J. Eum. Comm. (No. L 39) 1 (1978).
213 See Regulation 3587/82, supra note 204.
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under article 16(1)(b).
In December 1982, the Commission also introduced safeguard mea-
sures pursuant to article 15(1) on "tableware and other articles of a kind
commonly used for domestic or toilet purposes of stoneware" entering
France and the United Kingdom. 244 This safeguard was subsequently re-
voked and replaced by a voluntary export restraint agreement with South
Korea.245 The preambular wording of the Commission Regulation clearly
indicates that particular countries, including South Korea and Taiwan,
were the major source of market disruption.2 46 It is asserted in the Com-
mission Regulation that the EEC must respect its international obliga-
tions, and therefore the measures imposed should apply to all imports
equally.247 The Commission rejected South Korea's offer to negotiate a
voluntary restraint undertaking with the two most affected EEC coun-
tries on the ground that such an undertaking cuts across the exclusive
Community competence in matters falling within Regulation 288/82.28
The Commission consulted extensively with Member States, export-
ers and importers. 24 9 This action would seem to remove some of the fears
expressed earlier about the consultation procedure laid down in Regula-
tion 288/82.250 No evidence of "material injury" was established in the
case of pottery, but a positive finding was made in the case of stoneware
imported into France and the United Kingdom and quantitative restric-
tions were imposed for a period of three years.2 51 The decision was com-
municated to GATT under article XIX.25 2 An increase in imports and a
resultant surge in market share of imports, combined with consequent
employment effects in France and the United Kingdom, were the justifi-
cation for a finding of material injury.253
, Evidently, article 9 criteria have been utilized to ascertain the nature
of injury sustained.25 However, in April 1983 this Commission Regulation
was revoked and replaced by an agreement equivalent to a voluntary ex-
port restraint agreement between the EEC and South Korea.2 55 This lat-
24 Regulation 3528/82, supra note 204.
245 Regulation 873/83, supra note 204.
246 Regulation 3528/82, supra note 204, at 27 (preamble).
247 Id. at 29 (preamble).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 27 (preamble).
250 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
25' Regulation 3528/82, supra note 204, at 28 (preamble); id. at 29 (art. 3).
252 GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ARTICLE XIX-ACTION TAKEN BY THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, L/5447 (Jan. 12, 1983); GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND
TRADE, ARTICLE XIX-AcTION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ADDENDUM, L/5447]
Add. 1 (Aug. 26, 1983).
255 Regulation 3528/82, supra note 204, at 28-29 (preamble).
24 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9).
151 Regulation 873/83, supra note 204.
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ter agreement was subsequently challenged by a Member State, but reaf-
firmed by a Council decision.2 58 The preamble of the Commission
Regulation revoking the EEC quotas stipulates the quota level agreed to
by South Korea and states that the products in question will be subject
to export licenses in Korea and to a system of automatic import authori-
zation within the United Kingdom and France.257 The preamble also pro-
vides for import authorization and procedures.258 The original regulation
is repealed in its entirety. No reference is made to Talwan or the desira-
bility of maintaining non-discrimination vis-A-vis such imports.
This example demonstrates that, where safeguards are applied, the
supplier may have no choice but to negotiate a VER in order to preserve
at least a small but guaranteed share of the EEC market. This highlights
the protective nature of Regulation 288/82 and the difficulty that the
newly industrialized countries face when they are successful in penetrat-
ing the EEC market. Also, the EEC's enactment of Regulation 288/82
does not mean that resort will no longer be made to VER's. Clearly, both
are contemplated by the EEC.
The third application of safeguard measures was on certain catego-
ries of wood imported into France. 59 This safeguard represents a devia-
tion from Regulation 288/82 in that it was invoked on the basis of a natu-
ral disaster in France. Due to the disaster, there was an excess of wood
that had to be cut and that could not be left on the ground. It cannot
truly be seen as a trade strategy to protect domestic producers from more
efficient foreign suppliers. The measure was of limited duration, expiring
in December 1983.
The fourth application under Title V was based upon article 17,
when Italy took unilateral action to protect tube and pipe fittings.2 80 This'
action was overturned by the Commission, and Italy appealed to the
Council. Pending a Council decision, the Italian measures restricting such
imports were validated, and have been extended until a Council decision
is made. The ground for invoking safeguard measures was that "damage
had been sustained." No further justification was documented in the
Council decision to maintain the restrictions.
In neither of these latter two circumstances has a case been made to
support the finding of injury. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the
basis of such limited application; but as the former two applications drew
I" Regulation 2050/83, supra note 89.
257 Regulation 873/83, supra note 204, at 8 (preamble). This agreement is similar to
those allowed by GATT under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty provisions in arti-
cle VI.
25 Id. at 8 (preamble).
Regulation 169/83, supra note 204.
280 Council Decision, supra note 204.
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upon article 9 and the latter did not, it may be that the Commission and
Council are not strictly constrained by these criteria, as they appear to
disregard them when it is expedient to do so.
C. Overview of the Application of Regulation 288/82
An examination of the overall application of Regulation 288/82 to
date shows that there have been three direct applications of safeguard
measures (one of which may be considered a continuation of a pre-ex-
isting bilateral agreement under article 16(1)(b)) and ten surveillance
measures.261 When viewed over a period of eighteen months, this does not
seem to be an excessive application of the Regulation. However, the ap-
plication of Regulation 288/82 should be placed within the larger frame-
work of EEC actions. As noted above, it is difficult to ascertain what vol-
untary restraint measures have been taken during the same time
period.26 2 Regulation 288/82 must be seen as only one of several tools that
are available to the EEC to restrict the entry of goods into markets. Thus,
the limited application of the Regulation does not reflect a larger policy
oriented towards EEC liberalization of trade. On the contrary, the mere
existence of the Regulation and an awareness of its potential effects may
well constitute a substantial barrier to trade.
What has the EEC added to international trade practice and legisla-
tion by enacting Regulation 288/82? As noted earlier, it is clearly a pro-
tective measure. 263 However, rather than just providing substantive safe-
guards measures, the regulation also provides preventive or deterrent
safeguards through surveillance and investigative procedures. 2" The lat-
ter two measures tend to discourage what might be termed by the EEC as
"disruptive" imports, while the former prohibits or limits the entry of
products once a threshold level of injury is reached.
There are several provisions which make the Regulation unique and
controversial. First, the Regulation obviously provides a mechanism for
Member States, or the Commission, to act quickly and unilaterally to im-
plement interim, temporary or permanent safeguards. 2 5 The actual forms
of the safeguards, quantitative restrictions and import licencing are not
controversial. The regulation appears to be restricted to these measures
and does not contemplate the withdrawal or suspension of tariff conces-
sions as a safeguard measure. 26 6 This clearly distinguishes it from its
GATT counterpart, as does the fact that the actual cause of the injury
261 See supra notes 203-05.
262 See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 76-121 and accompanying text.
265 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 6-8 (arts. 15, 17).
26 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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does not have to be linked to the granting of a tariff concession, or trade
liberalization measure.87
The fact that the Regulation provides certain criteria for determining
whether injury has been sustained by domestic procedures 268 is a welcome
and significant addition. These criteria are not without some difficulty in
application. 2 9 They may represent a trend towards a better definition of
damage, and hopefully towards better standards for the application of
safeguard measures.
The safeguard provisions, however, appear to implicitly deviate from
the GATT non-discrimination norm and tend to favor or permit selective
action against importers. With the exception of the preamble27 0 there is
no indication that the Regulation contemplates equal treatment for all
importers. There is no de facto obligation to do so. An obligation may,
however, be implied. At the same time, the formulation of Regulation
288/82 is such that a conclusion of selectivity in the application of safe-
guards can certainly be drawn. 1 Such a conclusion does not preclude the
application of safeguards on a universal basis.
The investigation procedure provided for in the Regulation is novel
and raises serious questions as to whether those most seriously affected
by the application of safeguard provisions, namely importers, exporting
states and their industries, are allowed an opportunity to be heard. The
fact that these provisions are clearly set out as a procedure, thereby limit-
ing what otherwise might be implied, is clearly damaging to those who
export to the EEC. The consultation procedure applies only to EEC
Member States. This consultation, however, is the basis for application of
surveillance or safeguard measures.273 Thus the traders are not provided
with a significant opportunity to defend their case before restrictive mea-
sures are applied. The ability to take quick action is fundamental to the
whole framework of the Regulation. Safeguard action must be readily
available or severe damage may be sustained; however, it may not be nec-
essary to move quite as quickly as the Regulation envisages in order to
protect industry.
V. CONCLUSION
While Regulation 288/82 is in many respects similar to the GATT
267 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
218 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 4 (art. 9).
269 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
270 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 1 (preamble).
271 See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
273 Regulation 288/82, supra note 12, at 2 (art. 3).
274 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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safeguard provision found in article XIX, there are important differences
between the two. This can in part be attributed to their different objec-
tives. The GATT provision forms part of a larger trade framework and is
generally considered to be an escape clause which will encourage greater
subscription to the GATT while permitting the Contracting Parties to be
released from their obligations in extenuating circumstances. The Regula-
tion, on the other hand, forms part of the EEC's commercial policy, and
has been drafted with the protection of domestic industry in mind as a
priority. The Regulation does not envisage the liberalization of trade as
an objective per se. That is not to say that this may not be an EEC objec-
tive, but it is an objective which is not found within Regulation 288/82.
Although a discussion of reform measures for article XIX falls
outside the scope of this Article, 27 5 it is of value to examine whether Reg-
ulation 288/82 addresses some of the flaws of article XIX, and whether
the application of Regulation 288/82 safeguards is inconsistent with the
safeguard provisions of the GATT.
The standard of injury required to implement safeguard action under
the GATT is more onerous than that which is required in Title V (protec-
tive measures), despite the fact that the Regulation provides criteria for
the assessment of injury. The GATT provision requires "serious injury,"
while the Regulation only requires "substantial injury." Further, the large
number of criteria, the short time period allocated for decision making
and the fact that such information may not be available and thus may be
disregarded, all mitigate against a higher standard being applied in the
Regulation than in the GATT. The Regulation provides a broader basis
upon which justification for such action may be based. One of the indicia
enumerated may provide a sufficient reason to apply safeguards. Thus,
safeguards may be invoked more frequently than they would be under the
GATT provision. For a safeguard measure to be applied under article
XIX the increase in imports must stem from a GATT obligation, such as
a tariff concession or other trade liberalization measure. Although the
remedy provided under the Regulation is limited to quantitative restric-
tions, the basis for invoking such measures is not restricted to this. Safe-
guards invoked under the Regulation may not meet the "serious injury"
or the conditions required to justify the application of article XIX mea-
sures. As such, the EEC may find itself in breach of GATT when invoking
safeguard measures under Regulation 288/82. Similarly, it appears that
Regulation 288/82 contemplates selective safeguards, and this, too, would
constitute a breach of GATT. In fact, it would be a breach of one of the
GATT's most fundamental principles.
' For a discussion of these measures, see D. ROBERTSON, supra note 3, at 60-69; Hind-
ley, supra note 1, at 337-38; MacBean, supra note 4, at 156-61; Merciai, supra note 11, at
49-55; Tumlir, supra note 4, at 412-17.
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The issue of retaliation and the cost of invoking safeguard measures
is not directly dealt with under the Regulation. The EEC will remain lia-
ble to compensate under the GATT, whether or not the application of
safeguard measures is justified on the basis of article XIX conditions and
the substantive test. It may constitute an unwarranted invocation of
GATT safeguard measures, and thus the obligation to compensate may
still exist. There is no mention in the Regulation of a duty to consult or
negotiate outside the initial consultation and advisory committee. The
duty may be implied due to GATT obligations. However, one of the rea-
sons why the EEC favors selective safeguards is because they will not
have to compensate all exporters affected by the safeguard measures.
Rather, the EEC will be obliged to compensate or negotiate with only one
or perhaps a few exporters.
Both the EEC and the GATT provisions suffer the same flaws. There
is no limit on the duration of the safeguard measure imposed, nor is re-
medial action required to address the problems of the affected industry.
As a result, the status quo is maintained. Further, structural adjustments
are not being made to remedy the internal problems. Thus, emergency
situations are prolonged and are resolved through the application of long
term safeguard measures.
The investigation and surveillance procedures distinguish the Regu-
lation from its GATT counterpart. Both of these procedures discourage
trade in the EEC market, or at a minimum cause exporters to carefully
watch their markets to see whether such measures have been or will be
taken by the EEC. These measures can best be likened to deterrent or
preventive safeguards. They are certainly not contrary to the GATT, for
these measures can be considered an internal procedure to monitor im-
ports. However, because the results of the investigation procedure and
surveillance may ultimately lead to the application of safeguards, the na-
ture of the consultation and investigation procedure becomes important.
These procedures provide for quick action and do not afford an opportu-
nity to be heard to parties which are likely to be affected by safeguard
action. The procedures may be seen as a trade barrier which makes it
increasingly difficult for foreign imports to penetrate the EEC market.
This point, together with the highly protective nature of Regulation 288/
82, suggests that the EEC market has been placed one step farther from
the grasp of exporters.
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